I purchased the AmazonBasics 8-Sheet Micro-Cut Shredder a few months ago. For the price I think it’s a good buy. The CD shredding is a bit of a joke (use scissors), but it handles paper and cards admirably, cutting them into 4mm x 12mm pieces that will foil the casual antagonist. The 8-sheet capacity, compact size, and low cost make it a good choice for personal document filing. Tis the season.
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Brian Krebs’ recent experience highlights PayPal’s insecurity. The convenience and ease of use of PayPal give them a wide customer base, but their inherent untrustworthiness has long been reason for concern. For as long as I’ve used the service, I’ve been concerned about external attacks, like what Krebs experienced, as well as the internal threat – PayPal themselves have a history of freezing and diverting their users’ funds. Both of these concerns can be addressed via a proxy bank.
In 2008 I opened an online checking account with a new bank, completely separate from the financial institutions I normally use. The account has no “overdraft protection” or any line of credit. As with my PayPal account, I keep no money in the checking account. This checking account is the only account I associate with PayPal. When I want to make a purchase via PayPal, I transfer the needed funds from my primary financial institution to the checking account at the proxy bank. Since banks still subscribe to the archaic notion of “business days”, this transfer can sometime take up to week, but more frequently completes within 2-3 days.
The brief wait period is acceptable to me (it certainly reduces the ability to impulse buy) and gives me a level of security that otherwise cannot be achieved with PayPal. If someone breaks into my PayPal account, there’s nothing for them to steal. Even PayPal themselves have limited ability to steal funds. If an attacker is lucky, they may gain access to the account when I’m transferring funds in preparation for a purchase. My PayPal transactions are typically low-value, so at most this lucky attacker will acquire $100 or so. That’s an acceptable risk for the convenience of PayPal.
In the past I used this multilayer approach for all online purchases. A debit card from a proxy checking account at a different bank with no access to my primary accounts was the only thing I would use to make online purchases. When the account was compromised, the wait period for a new card wasn’t the inconvenience it normally is, since it had no impact on my day-to-day spending with my primary accounts. I think this type of security is required for shopping online, but responsible use of a credit card can offer acceptable protection for non-PayPal transactions without the hassle of a proxy account.
The web browser is one of our computers’ primary means of interaction with the unwashed mashes. Combined with the unfortunately large attack surface of modern browsers, this makes a sandbox which does not depend on the browser itself an attractive idea.
Firejail ships with default profiles for Firefox and Chromium. These profiles drop capabilities, filter syscalls, and prevent access to common directories like
~/.ssh. This is a good start, but I see little reason to give the browser access to much of anything in my home directory.
--private flag instructs Firejail to mount a new user home directory in a temporary filesystem. The directory is empty and all changes are discarded when the sandbox is closed – think of it as a more effective private browsing or incognito mode that also resets your browser to factory defaults.
$ firejail --private firefox
A more useful option for normal browsing is to specify a directory that Firejail should use as the user home. This allows you to keep a consistent browser profile and downloads directory, but still prevents the browser from accessing anything else in the normal user home.
$ mkdir ~/firefox $ mv ~/.mozilla ~/firefox/ $ firejail --private=firefox firefox
This is the method I default to for my browsing. I’ve created my own Firejail profile for Firefox at
~/.config/firejail/firefix.profile which implements this.
include /etc/firejail/disable-mgmt.inc caps.drop all seccomp netfilter noroot # Use ~/firefox as user home private firefox
The only inconvenience I’ve discovered with this is that linking my Vimperator configuration files into the directory from my dotfiles repository creates a dangling link from the perspective of anything running within the jail. Since it cannot access my real home directory, it cannot see the link target in the
~/.dotfiles directory. I have to copy the configuration files into
~/firefox and then manually keep them in sync. I modify these files infrequently enough that for me this is worth the trade-off.
The temporary filesystem provided by
--private is still useful when accessing websites that are especially sensitive (such as a financial institution) or especially shady. In my normal browser profiles, I have a number of extensions installed that block ads, disable scripts, etc. If these extensions completely break a website, and I don’t want to take the time to figure out which of the dozens of things I’m blocking are required for the website to function, I’ll just spin up a sandboxed browser with the
--private flag, comfortable in the knowledge that whatever dirty scripts the site is running are limited in their ability to harm me.
I perform something like 90% of my web browsing in Firefox, but use Chromium for various tasks throughout the day. Both run in Firejail sandboxes, helping to keep me safe when surfing the information superhighway. Other programs, like torrent applications and PDF readers, also make good candidates for running within Firejail.
I have previously mentioned prepaid debit cards. On ITS I discuss using prepaid debit cards for anonymous, cash-like digital transactions a bit more in-depth.
Their prepaid Visa and American Express gift cards can be purchased with cash at any Simon mall. No identification is required. To use the card with online merchants, you will likely need to register the card with an address so that it can pass AVS checks. This can be done through Tor with fake information.
Judge rules defendant can’t be forced to divulge PGP passphrase
A federal judge in Vermont has ruled that prosecutors can’t force a criminal defendant accused of having illegal images on his hard drive to divulge his PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) passphrase.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Jerome Niedermeier ruled that a man charged with transporting child pornography on his laptop across the Canadian border has a Fifth Amendment right not to turn over the passphrase to prosecutors. The Fifth Amendment protects the right to avoid self-incrimination.
Niedermeier tossed out a grand jury’s subpoena that directed Sebastien Boucher to provide “any passwords” used with the Alienware laptop. “Compelling Boucher to enter the password forces him to produce evidence that could be used to incriminate him,” the judge wrote in an order dated November 29 that went unnoticed until this week. “Producing the password, as if it were a key to a locked container, forces Boucher to produce the contents of his laptop.”